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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey presents recent developments in the law that should be of
particular interest to the real estate lawyer or real estate professional.' It
includes decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, the district courts of
appeal, and statutes, from the period of August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993.

II. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Attorney's Fees
Ganz v. HZJ, Inc.2 Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred in this per curiam decision. Justice
McDonald dissented without an opinion.
A delinquent taxpayer, HZJ, Inc., had sued to prevent the sale of tax
certificates on its land by the Dade County tax collector.' After the trial
court found the suit to be without merit, the tax collector filed a motion for
attorney's fees based upon section 57.105(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provided: "The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee ...in any
civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a
justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of
the losing party . . . .'
Because the tax collector had not specifically
pleaded that he was entitled to attorney's fees in his answer to the complaint
as required by the supreme court's 1991 opinion in Stockman v. Downs,5
the motion was denied.
The supreme court, however, ruled that a claim for attorney's fees need
not be pleaded specifically. 6 Such a requirement would make little sense
because:
[i]t is only after the case has been terminated that a sensible judgment
can be made by a party as to whether the adverse party raised nothing
but frivolous issues in the cause, and, if so, to file an appropriate mo1. This article does not include a discussion of family law issues, such as the distribution
of property upon divorce, of probate and trust law issues, or of the significant legislative
amendments to the planning and growth management process encompassed in Chapter 93-206
of the Florida Laws.
2. 605 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1992).
3. Id.at 872.
4. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(I) (1991).
5. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
6. Ganz, 605 So. 2d at 872-73.
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tion . . . seeking an entitlement to said attorney's fees under Section
57.015 .... .

B. Condominiums
Falk v. Beard.8 This unanimous per curiam decision involved review
of a final order of the Florida Public Service Commission ("PSC"). 9

A condominium management company was contractually obligated to
provide, inter alia, for electric service to the common areas of a condominium community. The contract provided that if the electric rate charged
by the local electric company increased by at least five percent, the management company was then entitled to distribute that additional cost to the unit
owners. A condominium unit owner challenged the increase by complaining
to the PSC that the management company was involved in the sale of
electricity.
The PSC made a preliminary finding that it had jurisdiction to
investigate the complaint.'" When the management company sought to
enjoin the PSC, the supreme court held that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction." After completing its investigation, the PSC concluded that
the management company was not in the business of selling electricity and,
therefore, it had no regulatory role over the management fee.' 2 The condominium owner challenged the PSC conclusion as arbitrary and capricious
based upon the contention that it contradicted the original finding of
jurisdiction.' 3 The supreme court gave short shrift to this argument. It
was one matter to conclude that the PSC had jurisdiction because a sale of
electricity might be involved and a completely different matter to decide
after a full investigation whether a sale of electricity was in fact involved. 4
The unit owner further challenged the conclusion based upon the
evidence. The supreme court pointed out that its role in reviewing findings
of the PSC was to simply determine if the order was supported by competent, substantial evidence.' 5 The record included evidence that: (1) the

7. Id. (quoting Autorico, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 485, 48788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
8. 614 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1993).
9. Id. at 1087.
10. Id. at 1089.
II. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Bryson, 569 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1990).
12. Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1087.
13. Id. at 1089.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1088.
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management company had to absorb any rate increase that was less than the
triggering five percent; 6 (2) there was no separate charge for the use of the
recreational facilities; 17 (3) there was no separate charge for electricity
consumed in using the recreational facilities; 8 and (4) the maintenance fee
increase was related to an electric rate increase rather than a consumption
increase." The fact that the increase was due to a rising electric rate and
not a consumption increase made this case easily distinguishable from
Fletcher Properties, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission. 20 In
Fletcher, the manager wanted to charge tenants for water based on their
individual consumptions as determined by meters.
In addition, in Falk, the unit owner claimed that the Florida Administrative Code 2 1 required a contrary finding. The supreme court reiterated
that the court's role in reviewing a PSC interpretation of rules that apply to
the PSC is merely to determine if the interpretation was clearly erroneous.
Without going into a detailed analysis, the court simply stated that under the
circumstances, the court could not rule that the PSC's interpretation was
erroneous or unauthorized.22
C. Eminent Domain
City of Ocala v. Nye." This was a per curiam opinion. Justice
Kogan dissented without writing an opinion.
In order to widen a street, the city brought a condemnation action to
acquire part of a tract of land. The tenants of the property made a claim for
the special damages to their business. Pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b) of
the Florida Statutes, these damages would be available only if part of a
landowner's property is condemned, not if the entire tract had been condemned. After determining that paying the business damages was more
expensive than taking the entire property, the city amended its petition to
seek condemnation of the entire property. The Fifth District Court of

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
opinion.

Id. at 1087.
Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1088.
Id.
Id.
356 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1978).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.049 (1993).
Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1089.
608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). The facts are all taken from the Florida Supreme Court
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Appeal held that condemning the entire property when only part is needed
exceeded the city's condemnation authority.24
The Florida Supreme Court reached a different conclusion. The court
observed that the Florida Constitution expressly granted every municipality
authority "to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions
and render municipal services . ..*.
"25 Except when that power is ex26
pressly limited by law, the only requirement is that the powers be used
solely in the furtherance of "municipal purposes."27 Section 166.021(2) of
the Florida Statutes defines municipal purpose as "any activity or power
which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions.,

2

'

The

Department of Transportation had been expressly granted the power to
acquire entire tracts of land for the purpose of minimizing acquisition
costs29 and the counties had been expressly given similar powers of

eminent domain.3" Logically, saving the taxpayers money was also a valid
municipal purpose.3 Thus, the lack of statutory authorization for the city
to take more property than it needed for this project did not prohibit it from
doing so in order to minimize the costs.
Florida Department of Revenue v. Orange County.3 2 Justice Kogan
wrote the unanimous decision. Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred.
Threatened with condemnation proceedings, a landowner agreed to sell
its property to the county. Under the sale agreement, the county was to pay
any documentary stamp tax that might be owed, although both parties
believed the transaction was immune from such tax. The Department of
Revenue disagreed and claimed the tax with interest and penalties.
The district court certified a question that narrowly focused upon the
facts of this case, i.e., it included the contractual provision that the county
was obligated to pay the tax if one was owed.33 The supreme court

24. Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Nye, 608 So. 2d at 16 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b)).
Id. at 17 (relying upon FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1991)).
Id. (quoting State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978)).
FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1989).

Id. § 337.27(2).

30. See id. § 127.01(b).

31. Nye, 608 So. 2d at 17.
32. 620 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1993).

33. Orange County v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 605 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). The Fifth District certified the following question:
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rephrased the question to be: "Is a property transfer immune from the
documentary stamp tax if it occurs as a result of an out-of-court settlement
in a condemnation proceeding?" 34 The supreme court answered this
rephrased question affirmatively.
The court noted that in the absence of a contrary contractual provision,
the seller would be obligated to pay the tax.3" However, if the seller must
pay the tax out of its sale proceeds, then the seller would not be fully
compensated for the lost land as is required by the Florida Constitution.3 6
That logic had led earlier to an administrative rule that the documentary
stamp tax could not be assessed when the transfer was pursuant to a
condemnation judgment.37 The public policy of encouraging parties to
settle rather than to litigate would be defeated if settlement was subject to
a tax that would not be imposed on a judgment. Consequently, the court
prohibited the assessment of the documentary stamp tax on a conveyance
made under threat of condemnation proceedings.3 "
D. Ethics
The Florida Bar v. St. Laurent.39 This was an unanimous per curiam
opinion.
St. Laurent, an attorney, was the president, director, and sole shareholder of a company that developed and marketed a time share condominium.
The Florida Bar filed two complaints against St. Laurent, alleging that he

WHEN A PROPERTY OWNER CONVEYS PROPERTY TO A COUNTY
UNDER THREAT OF CONDEMNATION AND IN LIEU OF EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS AND THE COUNTY IS CONTRACTUALLY
BOUND TO PAY ANY DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX ASSESSED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ON THE TRANSACTION, IS THE TRANSACTION IMMUNE FROM SUCH TAXATION EVEN THOUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE IMPOSES THE TAX DIRECTLY UPON THE
PROPERTY OWNER?
Id at 1335.
34. FloridaDep 't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992.
35. Id.
36. Id (relying on FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6). Article X, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution provides: "(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose
and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry
of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (emphasis added).
37. FloridaDep't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992; see FLA. ADMIN. CODE-ANN. r. 12B4.014(14) (1993).
38. FloridaDep't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992.
39. 617 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1993).
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prepared and executed time-share warranty deeds purporting to transfer clear
titles to properties that were actually encumbered, that he misused escrow
funds, and that he failed to use the funds received to pay off the underlying
mortgages. He pleaded "no contest" to the allegations and the referee
recommended he be given a public reprimand and a forty-five day
suspension, followed by two years of probation. The Bar wanted him
disbarred and appealed.
The conduct at issue did not involve the practice of law. However,
because he was a member of the bar at the time, he was subject to discipline
for violating the rules of professional responsibility." Because the attorney
had no experience in real estate law, had no previous disciplinary record,
had suffered severely during the pendency of the proceeding, which had
taken four years, had shown remorse, and the misconduct was based, at least
in part, on an honest mistake, the supreme court decided on a ninety-one
day suspension followed by probation, rather than disbarment. 4 I
E. Homestead
Butterworth v. Caggiano 2 Chief Justice Barkett wrote the majority
opinion in which Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding
joined. Justice Grimes wrote a dissenting opinion.
After Mr. Caggiano was convicted of racketeering, the state initiated
forfeiture proceedings against his residence. Caggiano's defense was that
the property was his homestead and thus was exempt from forfeiture
because article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that
homestead property:
shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for
house, field or other labor performed on the realty ....
Although the trial court rejected this argument, the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed in Caggiano's favor. The appellate court certified the
question, "Whether forfeiture of homestead under the RICO Act is forbidden

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1055.
Id.at 1056, 1057.
605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
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by article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution?" '4" The supreme court
agreed with the appellate court that the question should be answered in the
affirmative and approved the district court's decision.4"
Because the constitutional provision does not deal explicitly with
forfeiture, the court applied the tools of statutory and constitutional
construction to reach its conclusions. First, words are to be given their
usual and obvious meaning unless the text suggests they have been used in
a technical sense.46 The language used in the homestead exemption
appeared to be broad and nonlegal. Therefore, the term "forced sale" should
not be used in a narrow, technical sense. Moreover, by statute, all forfeited
property is sold by the state, so forfeiture does result in a forced sale.47
Second, the homestead provision is to be liberally construed, leading
to the conclusion that forfeiture should be included, in the event of doubt,
within the term "forced sale." Third, using the purpose approach, the homestead provision was intended to protect the family and to benefit the public
by providing families with greater security in their homes.48 This purpose
would best be furthered by protecting the homestead from forfeiture to the
state, as well as from levying creditors. In addition, forfeiture provisions
are to be strictly construed,49 leading to the conclusion that they should not
apply in the event of ambiguity.
Furthermore, article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides
three express exceptions to homestead protection from forced sale.
Forfeiture is not included. Invoking the rule, expressio unius est exclusio
alterious,5 ° the logical conclusion is that forfeiture was not intended to be
one of the exceptions and, therefore, was to be included in the protection.
Accordingly, homestead property cannot be the subject of a RICO forfeiture.
In his dissent, Justice Grimes pointed out that a RICO forfeiture does
not precisely fit the homestead provision because there is "no judgment,
decree, or execution which purports to be a lien on the property."'" The
history of the homestead provision demonstrates a purpose of protection
from economic misfortune. However, forfeiture is not caused by economics,

44. Caggiano v. Butterworth, 583 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
45. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57.
46. Id. at 58 (quoting City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90

(Fla. 1933)).
47. Id.at 59.

48. Id.at 60.
49. Id.at 58.
50. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of others.
51. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 61.
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but by misconduct.5" Florida courts have long imposed equitable liens on
53
homesteads based on the owner's fraud or reprehensible conduct.
Logically, this protection should not extend to a criminal's homestead that
was being used as an instrument of crime, as occurred in the instant case.
No innocent persons were in need of protection in this case because the
owner did not even have a family.54
Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Fishbein.55 Justice Grimes
wrote the majority opinion with which Justices Overton, McDonald, and
Harding concurred. Justice Shaw wrote a dissenting opinion with which
Chief Justice Barkett and Justice Kogan concurred.
Mr. Fishbein owned a valuable home, which was subject to several
mortgages. Although it knew that the Fishbeins were involved in marriage
dissolution proceedings, Palm Beach Savings & Loan loaned $1,200,000 to
Mr. Fishbein on the security of a mortgage that appeared to have been
executed by both Mr. and Mrs. Fishbein. Although witnessed and acknowledged, Mrs. Fishbein's signature was a forgery. Mr. Fishbein used
$930,000 of the loaned money to pay off the existing mortgages and the
property taxes.
When the bank brought foreclosure proceedings, Mrs. Fishbein claimed
the property as homestead. The circuit court, however, allowed the bank an
equitable lien for the $930,000 which Mr. Fishbein had used to pay the
existing mortgages and property taxes. The circuit court stayed foreclosure
proceedings for six months to allow Mrs. Fishbein to try to effect a sale.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the equitable lien based upon
Mrs. Fishbein's innocence of any wrongdoing. 6 The supreme court,
finding that the district court failed to look at the constitutional language,
reversed and reinstated the circuit court's order.57
The court reiterated that equitable liens can be imposed upon homesteads "where equity demands it" even though it is not expressly provided
for by the constitution.58 In this case, equity demanded it, regardless of
Mrs. Fishbein innocence, in order to avoid her being unjustly enriched.

52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 61.
54. Id. at 62.
55. 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993).

56. Fishbein v. Palm Beach Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 585 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991),
57. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 270, 271.

58. Id. at 270.

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

Allowing an equitable lien to the extent that the money was used to pay
existing mortgage debts and tax burdens would not place Mrs. Fishbein in
a worse position than she had been before Mr. Fishbein acquired the loan.
Conversely, denying the equitable lien would result in Mrs. Fishbein
receiving a windfall of $930,000.
Justice Shaw, in his dissenting opinion, noted that there are three
express exceptions to homestead protection from the imposition of a lien: 5 9
"the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for
the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for
,.0
These must be
house, field or other labor performed on the realty .
strictly construed. A careful analysis of case law revealed that virtually
every precedent was based upon one of the express exceptions. 6' Since the
bank could not claim to fit within one of the express exceptions, it should
not have been able to get an equitable lien on the property.62
F. Leases
The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparationof and
Representation of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions.63 This
was an unanimous per curiam opinion.
A petition presented the following question to The Florida Bar Standing
Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law:
Whether it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a property
manager, with or without a power of attorney, to draft and serve a
Three Day Notice, draft and file a Complaint for Eviction and Motion
for Default and obtain a Final Judgment and Writ of Possession for the
landlord in an uncontested residential eviction and, if so, whether the
practice should be authorized.64
When the Committee produced a proposed advisory opinion, the petitioner
objected.
The supreme court concluded that, under current law, a property
manager could draft and serve a three-day eviction notice. It was, however,
unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to draft and to file a complaint

59. Id. at 271.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 271-72.
Id.at 272.
605 So. 2d 868 (1992).
Id.at 869.
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for eviction or a motion for default, or to obtain a final judgment and writ
of possession. The court decided to conduct an experiment. For one year,
it would allow property managers to do these things, for example file a
complaint, in uncontested residential evictions based upon the nonpayment
of rent if the court-approved forms 65 were used. The court invited
comments on the practice to be filed with its clerk during that year. It will
be interesting to hear the outcome of this experiment. Perhaps allowing
property managers to handle simple uncontested residential evictions will
save money, which will result in a savings to landlords and tenants.
However, this author suspects that the savings will not trickle down very far.
G. Lis Pendens
Chiusolo v. Kennedy.66 This was a per curiam opinion in which Chief
Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan
concurred. Justice Harding wrote an opinion expressing his concurrence in
part and his dissent in part.
Louis Chiusolo claimed that he was to have received stock in a
corporation in exchange for having advanced money to the corporation for
the purchase of some land. When the stock was not delivered, Chiusolo
filed suit seeking a resulting and constructive trust on the property." With
the suit, he filed a notice of lis pendens, but the circuit court discharged it.
The district court reversed, quashed and remanded68 and held that the
proponent of the challenged lis pendens has two burdens: (1) demonstrating
that the claim affects the real property; and (2) that there is a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. The second requirement was based upon
section 48.23(3) of the Florida Statutes. Section 48.23(3) provides:
When the initial pleading does not show that the action is founded on
a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimed under part I of chapter
713 [i.e., a mechanic's or construction lien], the court may control and
discharge the notice of lis pendens as the court may grant and dissolve
injunctions.69

65. See The Florida Bar re Approval of Forms Pursuant to Rule 10-1.1(b) of The Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 591 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991).
66. 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).

67. Id. at 492.
68. Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 589 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
69. FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (1991).
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The supreme court accepted the case based upon conflict jurisdiction7"
and rejected the second burden. The court pointed out that the doctrine of
lis pendens serves not only to protect a plaintiff from intervening liens, but
also to protect future purchasers and encumbrancers from "buying" a
lawsuit, even a lawsuit that they would win. 7' The court concluded that
the statutory reference to injunctions existed to allow a court to impose a
bond as a condition of a continuation of the lis pendens, just as it could
impose a bond as a condition of granting an injunction.72 Consequently,
"the lis pendens cannot be dissolved if, in the evidentiary hearing on request
for discharge, the proponent can establish a fair nexus between the apparent
legal or equitable
ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the
73
lawsuit.

Justice Harding's point of dissent was with the court's having placed74
the burden of proving a fair nexus on the proponent of the lis pendens.
He would place the burden of showing the lack of a fair nexus on the one
challenging the lis pendens. However, proving the lack of a connection
means negating all possibilities. This may impose an impossible burden, and
for that reason, this author concludes that the court was correct.
H. P. UD. Litigation
Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc. 75 Justice Harding wrote the unanimous

decision.
Dissident homeowners in a planned unit development filed an
unsuccessful suit over its operation against the developer who was awarded
its costs in the final judgment. The developer subsequently brought this
action seeking damages for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with
contractual rights, tortious interference with an advantageous business
relationship, civil conspiracy, and slander of title. The questions presented
to the supreme court were: (1) whether the developer's election to tax costs
in the earlier suit barred it from bringing this malicious prosecution suit; (2)
whether the developer's complaint had failed to state a claim for tortious
interference claims or civil conspiracy; and (3) whether the developer's
70. The Fifth District's Chiusolo opinion conflicted with Cacaro v. Swan, 394 So. 2d
538 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 402 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1981). Cacaro was

disapproved to the extent that it was in conflict with this supreme court decision.
71.

Chiusolo, 614 So. 2d at 492.

72. Id. at 493.
73. Id.at 492.
74. Id. at 493.
75. 609 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1992).
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claim for slander of title was a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier
action.76
The first issue provided the court with its conflict jurisdiction." The
court distinguished its holding in Cate v. Oldham" with the case at bar.
Cate prohibited a state official, who had been sued only in his or her official
capacity and had recovered costs, from bringing a malicious prosecution
suit. That holding would bar the official from a double recovery because
the official could seek no more than the recovery of costs. However, the
situation in Londono was different. The Londono developer was seeking
compensatory and punitive damages, plus interest and costs.7 9 These
damages were different from and additional to the costs it had recovered in
the first action; therefore, the damages were not barred by the developer's
election to seek costs in the first action.
The tortious interference and civil conspiracy counts were based on
allegations that the homeowners made numerous intentional and malicious
false statements to third parties and local government officials for the
purpose of harming the developer's economic interests. The homeowners,
joined by the Attorney General as amicus curiae, argued that the homeowners' complaints to zoning officials were protected by the First Amendment and that this suit was an intimidation suit. Because the developer was
a private person, in Nodar v. Galbreath"° the court required the plaintiff
to show that the defendant had acted with express malice. However, the
complaint was facially sufficient when the allegations were accepted as true
and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, which was the appropriate
standard in determining whether the complaint stated a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted."' Consequently, the trial court should not
have dismissed the complaint.
The third issue in Londono was whether the claim was barred under
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure because the slander of title claim was
a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier action.8" The question turned on

76. Id. at 16.
77. The district court decision, Turkey Creek, Inc. v.Londono, 567 So. 2d 943 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), was in conflict with Cypher v. Segal, 501 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987), giving the supreme court conflict jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3)
of the Florida Constitution.
78. 450 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1984).

79. Id. at 224.
80. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).

81. Id.
82. Londono, 609 So. 2d at 19. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
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the "logical relationship test," but the court pointed out that "stating this test
is far easier than determining if a claim passes [it]."83 The test was:
[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out
of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two
senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis
of both claims; or (2) that the aggregate core of facts upon which the
original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant
that would otherwise remain dormant.84
The claims in the homeowners' initial suit were based upon their allegations
that the developer had mismanaged the development. The claims focused
upon the developer's alleged misconduct. In this suit, the claims were based
upon the developer's allegations that the homeowners had intentionally and
maliciously spread false and defamatory information about the developer
and the development, i.e., it focused upon the homeowners' alleged
misconduct. Consequently, this was not a compulsory counterclaim because
it failed the logical relationship test.
I. Tax Certificates and Deeds
Dawson v. Saada.85 Justice Harding wrote the unanimous opinion.
Following a tax sale, a tax deed to the Saadas' property was issued to
the Dawsons who subsequently brought this action to quiet their title. The
Saadas defended on the basis that the notice of the sale had not been served
by the sheriff, as required by section 197.522(2) of the Florida Statutes.86
The question certified to the supreme court was:
WHETHER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 197.522, FLORIDA STATUTES, INVALI-

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, provided it arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FLA R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
83. Londono, 609 So. 2d at 20.
84. Id.(quoting Neil v. South Fla. Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 198 1) (quoting Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1970))).
85. 608 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1992).
86. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 197.522 (1987).
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DATES THE ISSUANCE OF A TAX DEED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE LANGUAGE IN SECTIONS 197.404 AND 65.081(3), FLORIDA
STATUTES?"

In Dawson, there had been compliance with section 197.522(1), which
required that the clerk, by certified mail with return receipt requested, notify
all the persons listed in the tax collector's statement twenty days prior to the
tax sale. The court concluded that the notice given to the Saadas was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. 8 Furthermore, the
plain language in section 197.522(2) indicated that the Legislature intended
that its notice provision was to be directory only, not mandatory.89
Consequently, failure to give that notice did not invalidate the tax deed.9"
The court went on to provide some interesting dicta in order to
completely answer the certified question. Both section 197.404 and section
65.081(3) of the Florida Statutes seemed to provide that the tax deed could
not be attacked due to lack of notice. Section 65.081(3) provided:
No defense to the action [in chancery to quiet the title to land included
in a tax deed] or attack upon the tax deed shall be made except the
defense that the taxes assessed against the property had been paid by the
former owner before issuance of the tax deed. 9'
Section 197.404 had provided:
A sale or conveyance of real or personal property for nonpayment shall
not be held invalid except upon proof that: (1) The property was not
subject to taxation; (2) The taxes had been paid before the sale of
personal property; or (3) The tax certificate on the real property had
been redeemed before the execution and delivery of a deed based upon
a certificate issued for nonpayment of taxes.92

The court concluded that these sections must be read in light of the
constitutional requirement of notice. These statutes could not preclude an
attack on a tax deed that was void for lack of notice required by section
197.522(1) because that notice was constitutionally required.

87. Dawson, 608 So. 2d at 807.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
See id. at 810.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 65.081(3) (1987).
FLA. STAT. § 197.404 (1989) (repealed 1991).
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As that notice had been provided in this case, the validity of the tax
deed was upheld. Therefore, the certified question would have to be
answered both "yes" and "no." Although failure to comply with the notice
requirements of section 197.522(1) of the Florida Statutes would invalidate
the issuance of a tax deed, notwithstanding the language in sections 197.404
and 65.081, the failure to comply with the notice requirements of section
197.522(2) does not.
Walker v. Palm Beach Commerce Center Associated.9 3 Justice Kogan
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett, and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred. Justice McDonald wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
When Palm Beach Commerce Center contested the 1990 tax assessment
valuation of its property, it sought a temporary injunction against the
issuance of tax certificates. The trial court denied the temporary injunction
on the ground that the Center had failed to establish the likelihood that it
would ultimately succeed on the merits. On appeal, the district court
disagreed. It held that section 194.211 of the Florida Statutes 94 required
only that the taxpayer make a good faith payment of the estimated taxes due
as the taxpayer had done here.
The court rephrased the certified question, breaking it into two parts.
The first part asked:
MAY A TAXPAYER SEEKING TO ENJOIN THE SALE OF TAX
CERTIFICATES PENDING A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSESSED
VALUATION OF ITS PROPERTY PROCEED UNDER SECTION
194.211 ?9'

The Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. The
statute did not explicitly apply to the sale of tax certificates. The tax
appraiser had argued that, based upon the history of the statute, a temporary

93. 614 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1993).
94. Section 194.211, Florida Statutes, provided:

In any tax suit, the court may issue injunctions to restrain the sale of real or
personal property for any tax which shall appear to be contrary to law or equity,
and in no case shall any complaint be dismissed because the tax assessment
complained of, or the injunction asked for, involves personal property only.
§ 194.211 (1989).
95. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1098.

FLA. STAT.
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injunction should be available only to prevent sale of the property two
years96 after the sale of the tax certificates, and not to prevent the sale of
the tax certificates. The court, however, rejected the tax appraiser's
argument.
Having answered the first part in the affirmative, the court proceeded
to the second part of the question, which was:
WHAT SHOWING IS NECESSARY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION? 97
Relying on the plain language of the statute, 98 the court concluded that the
traditional requisites for a temporary injunction need not be established
when seeking relief under this statute. A taxpayer is entitled to a temporary
injunction if he has made "a showing of a substantial likelihood of success
in the underlying tax suit" as well as having made a good faith payment of
the taxes due. 99 The unfortunate taxpayer here lost because he had only
done the latter.
In HoteleramaAssociates v. Bystrom, 00 the third district had reached
the opposite conclusion. Consequently, it was overruled "to the extent it
conflicts with this decision."' 0 '
Although Justice McDonald concurred in the result, his rationale
differed in the following way.0 First, he pointed out that section 194.211
applied to the sale of property but the issuance of a tax certificate merely
imposed a lien on property. Consequently, this section should not provide
a basis for an injunction against the issuance of a tax certificate. Second,
the Legislature explicitly provided an adequate remedy at law, i.e., the
cancellation of tax certificates under sections 197.443 and 197.444. Third,
the general requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction should apply
because there was nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended otherwise

96. Actually two years after April Iof the year of issuance, if the tax certificate has not
been redeemed by the landowner. FLA. STAT. § 197.502(1) (Supp. 1992).
97. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1098.

98. "In any tax suit, the court may issue injunctions to restrain the sale of real or
personal property for any tax which shall appear to be contrary to law or equity ....
" FLA.
STAT. § 194.211 (1991).
99. Id.
100. 449 3o. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984).
101. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1100 (quoting Hotelerama Assocs. v. Bystrom, 449 So. 2d
836 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).

102. Id.
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and these requirements included, inter alia, the unavailability of an adequate
remedy at law.' 3
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elliott."4 Justice Shaw wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Overton, Kogan, and Harding
concurred."0 5 Chief Justice Barkett wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices McDonald and Grimes joined.' °6
Charles Elliott tendered tax certificates, endorsed in blank before a
notary public, as collateral for loans. When Elliott's assets were placed in
receivership, the lenders discovered that the tax certificates had been frozen
by court order. The receiver claimed that the lenders were unsecured
creditors because the lenders had not perfected their security interest in the
certificates by filing with the Secretary of State as required for security
interests in general intangibles by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit posed the
following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does a Florida Tax certificate represent an interest in land for purposes
of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, so that Article 9 does not
govern the creation of a security interest therein by virtue of §
679.104(1 0)?'08

The majority answered the question in the affirmative and held that
Article 9 did not govern. Under section 197.102(3), a tax certificate is a
lien on real property. However, Article 9 does not apply "to the creation or
transfer of a

. .

.lien on real estate ...

."'09

The plain language of these

sections would seem to exclude the creation of a security interest in a tax
certificate from Article 9. Moreover, section 679.102(2) provides that
Article 9 does not generally apply to statutory liens. The majority rejected
the claim that commercial lenders might be harmed by finding Article 9
inapplicable, because that had not occurred in this case, and any lender
considering the land as collateral would know of the existence of the tax
certificate and its implications.
103. Id.
104. 620 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1993).
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.102 (1991).
108. Elliott, 620 So. 2d at 159.
109. FLA. STAT. § 679.104(10) (1991).

Brown

1993]

The dissent considered that a tax certificate being used to secure a loan
was analogous to a mortgage being used to secure a debt. It relied, as did
the majority, on the official comment to section 679.102 to justify the
conclusion, although the official comment fails to support clearly either the
majority or the dissent.
Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker."0° Justice Grimes wrote
the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. Justice McDonald was recused.
The court was presented with two certified questions. The first
certified question asked:
IS LAND OWNED BY A MUNICIPALITY EXEMPT FROM REAL
ESTATE TAXATION IF IT WAS LEASED TO A PRIVATE PARTY
PRIOR TO APRIL 15, 1976, AND IS USED FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES?"'
The Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. The
golf course was leased from the City of Tallahassee under a ninety-nine year
lease. It was admittedly not being used for public or municipal purposes,
so it did not fit within the tax exemption provided by article VII, section 3
of the Florida Constitution. Nor did the court find that it fit within the
exemption provided by Florida Statute section 196.199(4).'12
The second certified question presented to the court was:
IF THE LAND IS SUBJECT TO REAL ESTATE TAXATION,
SHOULD THE VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE APPRAISAL
IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT
13
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT?"

110.

613 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1993).

111. Id. at 450.
112. Section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes, provides:

Property owned by any municipality, agency, authority, or other public body
corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold interest or other
possessory interest of a nongovernmental lessee other than that described in
paragraph (2)(a), after April 14, 1976, shall be subject to ad valorem taxation
unless the lessee is an organization which uses the property exclusively for
literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes.
FLA. STAT. § 196.199(4) (1991).
113. Tucker, 613 So. 2d at 450.
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This was also answered in the negative.'
The taxpayer had argued that failing to subtract the value of the lease
from the valuation of the property to arrive at the real property tax
assessment would subject it to unconstitutional double taxation because it
was also being taxed on the leasehold under the intangible tax. The court
rejected this argument. The intangible tax was imposed upon the lessee's
interest and would be collected by the state. The real estate tax was
imposed on the land itself and would be collected by the county. The only
reason that the lessee was obligated to pay the real estate tax was that it had
contractually obligated itself to make that payment.

III.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DECISIONS

A. Caveat Emptor
Haskell Co., v. Lane Co. "5 The roof of a commercial building
collapsed during a severe rainstorm, injuring two shoppers as well damaging
the property of the tenant. The district court felt required by existing law
to hold that the tenant and the successor landlord could not recover from the
original landlord due to the doctrine of caveat emptor. Noting that caveat
emptor has been abrogated in residential real estate transactions, the court
agreed that a similar change might be due, perhaps by adopting section 353
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts," 6 in the law of commercial real

114. Id. at 452.
115. 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Restatement (Second) Torts, section 353, provides:
Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Vendor.
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to
persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land
with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the
condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or
the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes
or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will
not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in
Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable
opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability
continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the
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estate, but that such a change should come from the Florida Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the court certified the following question:
SHOULD THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
CONTINUE TO APPLY TO COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS; AND, IF NOT, WITH WHAT LEGAL PRINCIPLES SHOULD IT BE REPLACED?"'

This author urges the supreme court to consider the question. It is time
to eliminate the double standard. The same principles of good faith, duty
to disclose, and implied warranties should apply equally to commercial
property transactions.
B. Condominiums
BB Landmark, Inc. v. Haber."8 Under section 718.503(1)(a) of the
Florida Statutes (1989), a buyer could avoid a contract to purchase a new
condominium after receiving notice that the developer has amended the
offering in a way that "materially alters or modifies the offering in a manner
which is adverse to the buyer." In this case, the developer unilaterally
increased the cost of extras from $10,384 to $17,122. In response, the
buyers sent proper written notice of their intent to cancel the contract. The
developer, however, tried to avoid cancellation by announcing that it would
honor the original price.
The court was faced with a case of first impression. It found the
meaning of the statute to be clear and unambiguous and, therefore, the plain
meaning of the terms should govern. A cost increase would be adverse to
the buyer's interest, and a 65% increase in the cost of the extras would be
material. Once the developer had so amended the offering, the buyer had
fifteen days to exercise the right to cancel. That right could not be extinguished by the developers taking the unilateral action of abandoning the
proposed modifications. Consequently, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.

condition and to take such precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).

117. Haskell, 612 So. 2d at 676.
118. 619 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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CarlandiaCorp. v. Rogers & FordConstructionCorp. 9 The district
court was faced with a case of first impression in deciding whether a unit
owner could maintain an action against the developer to recover for
construction defects in the common elements or common areas. Under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a), a real party in interest may sue in
his own name. 2 ° A unit owner does own an undivided share in the
common elements, so it is a real party in interest. Additionally, there is
nothing in the statute, authorizing the condominium association to bring
suits, that would preclude a unit owner from bringing such a suit.
Recognizing that this conclusion may produce "practical difficulties," the
court certified the following question to the supreme court:
MAY AN INDIVIDUAL CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNER MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN THE
COMMON ELEMENTS OR COMMON AREAS OF THE CONDOMINIUM?...
However, the practical problems created for the court by such litigation
are probably slight compared to the practical problems encountered by a unit
owner trying to bring such a suit. The lack of precedent reveals how
infrequently this situation arises and indicates that the supreme court's time
is probably better spent on other issues.
C. Construction (Mechanic's)Liens
CoppenbargerHomes, Inc. v. Williamson.'2 2 A subcontractor is sued
to foreclose on a construction lien. The contractor posted a transfer bond
and the landowner was dropped from the suit. The judgment entered was
greater than the amount of the bond and the court allowed the excess to be
an unsecured judgment against the contractor. The district court agreed,
pointing out that the mechanism for increasing the transfer bond'23 was
not intended to limit the amount of the judgment, but to provide a method
by which a lienholder might preserve the adequacy of its security.

119. 605 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), ajfd sub nom. Rogers & Ford
Constr. Corp. v. Carlandia Corp., No. 80,788, 1993 WL 458843 (Fla. Nov. 10, 1993).
120. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a) provides that "[elvery action may be
FLA R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest ....
121. Carlandia, 605 So. 2d at 1016.
122. 611 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
123. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 713.24(3) (1991).
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Davis Water & Waste Industries Inc. v. Embry Development Corp.24
'
A supplier claimed a construction lien on abutting land under Florida Statute
section 713.04 regarding subdivision improvements.
However, the
developer's land was not actually contiguous with the land on which the
materials were installed. The court concluded that the meaning of the
statute was plain and that the supplier was not entitled to the lien.' 25
Meyerowich v. Carrere General Contractors.'6 In order to protect
against the possibility of multiple suits when the materials are supplied by
a partnership, all the partners are indispensable parties to a construction lien
foreclosure. However, the court concluded that a partner whose claim has
become barred by the statute of limitations is not indispensable. The
contractor had raised nonjoinder of the materialman's partner at the close of
the evidence. In response, the partner sought to intervene, but the trial court
denied the motion even though the partner did not seek to introduce any
new evidence.' 27 Then the trial court dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party.'
The district court held that the trial court had erred
2 9
in both decisions.
Taylor v. T.R. Properties, Inc. 3 ' The court held that a lienholder,
who was defending his priority in foreclosure action brought by another
lienholder, must, in its answer, make a demand for attorney's fees unless the
opposing party has waived such demand. This is a logical extension of the
current train of thought regarding claims for attorney's fees.
D. Covenants
Palm Point Property Owners 'Ass 'n v. Pisarski.3' The Association's
membership was made up of property owners who individually could have
sued to enforce the restrictive covenants. However, the Association was
apparently riot itself a property owner. It was not a direct successor of the
developer or of any its interests. And its existence was not contemplated in

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

603 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 1359.
611 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
603 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).

131. 608 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approvedby 18 Fla. L. Weekly S547

(Fla. Oct. 21, 1993).
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the development scheme.' 32 These are the typical bases for finding that
an association has standing to enforce the deed restrictions, so the Association's standing was challenged when it attempted to enforce the covenants
against a landowner.
The district court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had adopted
Rule 1.221,"' to give condominium associations the standing to sue, and
Rule 1.222, '3 to give mobile homeowners' associations the standing to
sue. It would make sense to give a property owners' association similar
standing but, absent such a rule, the district court felt obligated to conclude
that it had no standing. 35 However, the district court invited the supreme
court to consider such a rule by certifying as a question of great public
importance:
ABSENT A SPECIFIC RULE OF PROCEDURE, DOES A PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION THAT IS NOT A DIRECT SUCCESSOR TO THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPER AND PROVISION
FOR WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE GRANTOR'S ORIGINAL SUBDIVISION SCHEME HAVE STANDING TO SUE TO
MAINTAIN6 AN ACTION TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVE13
NANTS?

Denying standing to this homeowners' association accomplished little
other than wasting the time and resources of the litigants and the courts. If
asked, this author would have urged the district court to reach a different
conclusion. The supreme court should adopt a rule giving homeowners'
associations standing where that will promote judicial efficiency and lessen
the obstacles to enforcing valid restrictions.

132. Id. at 538.
133. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.221 provides in pertinent part: "After control
of a condominium association is obtained by unit owners other than the developer, the
association may institute, maintain, settle or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf
of all unit owners concerning matters of common interest ....
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
134. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 provides that "[a] mobile homeowners'
association may institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf
of all homeowners concerning matters of common interest .... " FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.222.
135. Palm Point Property Owners'Ass'n, 608 So. 2d at 539.
136. Id.
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E. Developer Liability

' The purchasers of a
Robinson v. Palm Coast Construction, Inc. 37
new condominium unit discovered that they could not park two regular sized
automobiles in their garage even though the condominium covenants
required that the garage be big enough to do just that. The garage did,
however, conform to the dimensions on the plans. The court was faced with
the issue of "whether ... purchasers of new condominium units from the

developer, can have any cause of action where the units are built in
accordance with the plans and specifications but violate the construction
While the
standards of the condominium's restrictive covenants."'
purchaser could not recover on the theory of negligence under the economic
loss rule, the district court concluded that the condominium developer had
an implied duty to build in compliance with the condominium's restrictive
covenants. Failure to do so would be a breach of contract even if the
condominium never tried to enforce the covenants.
F. Eminent Domain
Patel v. Broward County.'39 The reasonable probability of obtaining
rezoning is a factor that may be considered when the value of condemned
land is being determined. But in this case, the government submitted
evidence that severance damages should be reduced because the condemnee
could relocate and reconstruct its lost parking facilities if it received a
variance. The condemnees argued that based upon two first district
cases, 4 ° the evidence should not have been admitted. The court, however,
noted that the distinction between rezoning and the granting of a variance
has become somewhat clouded, to say the least, and that such evidence
would be admissible in at least two other states. 4 ' Consequently, it
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as being of
great public importance:
MAY THE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT EVIDENCE THAT THE
SEVERANCE DAMAGES OF A CONDEMNEE MAY BE CURED
OR LESSENED BY ALTERATIONS TO THE CONDEMNEE'S

137.
138.
139.
140.
and State
141.

611 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 1353.
613 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Williams v. State Dep't of Transp., 579 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
Dep't of Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
Patel, 613 So. 2d at 583. The two states are New York and Connecticut.
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PROPERTY WHEN THOSE ALTERATIONS REQUIRE THE
GRANT OF A VARIANCE FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY HAVING ZONING JURISDICTION OVER THE
14
PROPERTY? 1

This author suggests that the question is worthy of the supreme court's
attention. It seems illogical to allow the admission of evidence regarding
the effects of possible rezoning but not similar evidence regarding the
effects of a variance that might be obtained. If the latter should be excluded
because it is based upon speculation, then so should the former. Perhaps the
Legislature can create a means for the government to obtain the rezoning or
variance for the landowner. Absent that, it seems wrong to reduce the
landowner's severance damages based on either rezoning or a variance,
which might not materialize.
G. Licenses and Easements
Tatum v. Dance.'43 In a package deal, Dance bought parcel A from
the architect who designed Dance's car dealership. Even though Dance did
not expressly acquire a drainage easement, the dealership was designed to
drain onto parcel B, which was still owned by the architect. Parcel B was
later sold to Tatum who sold it to Dance. Tatum took back a purchase
money mortgage that was the subject of this foreclosure action in which
Dance sought a declaration recognizing his drainage rights. The district
court affirmed the trial court's holding that an irrevocable license had been
created by the construction of the automobile dealership in such a way that
it drained onto parcel B. The court relied upon Albrecht v. Drake Lumber
Co.' for the propositions that: (1) an irrevocable license is created when
a permanent structure is constructed in reliance upon a parol license; and (2)
an irrevocable license can not be revoked by the licensor's successor who
took title with notice of the licensee's use.' 45

What caused a problem, however, was that Albrecht had also included
the statement that an irrevocable license "becomes an easement."' 4 6
However, a more recent case, MooringsAss 'n v. TortoiseIsland Communi-

142. Id.
143. 605 So. 2d I 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted sub nom. Dance v.
Tatum, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1993).
144. 65 So. 98 (Fla. 1914).
145. Id.at 100; Tatum 605 So. 2d at 112.
146. Albrecht, 65 So. at 100.
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ties, Inc."' had held that easements could not be created without a signed
writing. 4 Logically, that would lead to the conclusion that an irrevocable
license could not have been created here, as there was no writing. But the
Tatum court decided that TortoiseIslanddealt only with implied easements,
not irrevocable licenses. It reasoned that an irrevocable license is the
product of equitable relief. 4 9 It is not an easement, although in some
circumstances it may be the functional equivalent of an easement. Because
it is the product of equitable relief which is personal, the benefit of the
license would not be transferred to a vendee of the land, as the trial court
had suggested. However, the district court did certify the following
question:
WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF MOORINGS ASSOCIATION, INC. V.
TORTOISE ISLAND COMMUNITIES.. . THE STATEMENT IN

ALBRECHT V. DRAKE LUMBER CO.,... TO THE EFFECT THAT
AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE BECOMES AN EASEMENT BASED
ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, MEANS THAT AN IRREVOCABLE
LICENSE CAN NO LONGER EXIST IN FLORIDA.1 50

Judge Sharp wrote a special concurrence.' 5' She concluded that the
license, which was created upon the construction of the dealership, was
extinguished by merger when Dance acquired the servient land, parcel B.
However, easements by necessity could still be created without a writing
after Albrecht. So, when Tatum later acquired title to parcel B at the
foreclosure sale, his title was subject to a newly created easement by
necessity. Moreover, consistent with Albrecht, an easement could have been
created without a writing by the construction of the dealership because
performance would take that transaction out of the Statute of Frauds.'5 2
Consequently, she suggested that the certified question should have been:
WHETHER MOORINGS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. TORTOISE ISLAND
COMMUNITIES... EXTINGUISHES THE CREATION OF ORALLY

CREATED EASEMENT RIGHTS IN ALL SITUATIONS OTHER

147. 460 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashedsub nom. Tortoise Island
Communities, Inc. v. Moorings Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1986) (approving the dissent
below).
148. Id. at 969.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Tatum, 605 So. 2d at 112.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
Id. at 114 (Sharp, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 115.
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THAN THOSE CREATED BY "NECESSITY" OR WHETHER AN
EASEMENT CAN STILL BE CREATED BY EXECUTION, EXPENDITURES IN IMPROVEMENTS, AND RELIANCE ON AN ORAL
LICENSE GIVEN BY THE SERVIENT LANDOWNER AS IN
ALBRECHT V. DRAKE LUMBER CO...
This author agrees with Judge Sharp's analysis. It would allow
successors in ownership to parcel A to benefit from the drainage easement
unless, of course, they should fall victims to estoppel. However, the
supreme court should consider taking the case to eliminate any confusion
about the continued existence of irrevocable licenses under Florida law.
H. Mortgages
Carteret Savings Bank v. Weiner.'54 This involved the question of
what is the effect of closing a home equity account. A line of credit had
been given to a husband and wife. First the husband closed the account, but
later reopened it and drew money. The wife then asked that the account be
closed. When the account was reopened at the husband's insistence, the
wife drew money. On default, the lender sought foreclosure. The defense
was that reopening the account was a new agreement that could not
encumber entireties property without the participation of both spouses.
The district court pointed out that neither party had pleaded or proved
that a novation had occurred when the account was closed and subsequently
reopened. The bank could not be barred from foreclosing as a matter of law
by allowing the account to be repeatedly closed and reopened by one spouse
because it had not been notified that the husband and wife were experiencing marital difficulties.'55 Consequently, attorneys should advise their coborrower clients that, when closing a home equity line of credit, they should
make sure that the lender acknowledges in writing that the closing is
permanent and the account cannot be reopened without the agreement of
both co-borrowers.
Citibank Mortgage Corp. v. Carteret Savings Bank.'56 Citibank's
predecessor in interest obtained a judgment against Omni in 1987 and
recorded a certified copy of the judgment in Palm Beach County. In 1988,

153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. 601 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).

155. Id. at 1312.
156. 612 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review grantedsub noma. Carteret

Sav. Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp., 18 Fla. L. Weekly 67 (Fla. Sept 22, 1993).
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Omni become a joint venturer in developing a parcel of land acquired with
part of the proceeds of a loan from Carteret. Carteret foreclosed and
claimed priority, as a purchase money lender, over Citibank'sjudgment lien.
The trial court agreed, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
Carteret was entitled to priority as a purchase money lender only to the
extent that the loan proceeds had been used to acquire the property.157
That amount included funds used to pay off what the seller still owed on the
land.
Noting that this was a case of first impression in Florida, the court
certified the following question as being of great public importance:
WHERE A THIRD PARTY MORTGAGE LOAN IS USED NOT
ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING PROPERTY, BUT IN
ADDITION, FOR CONSTRUCTING IMPROVEMENTS ON THE
PROPERTY, IS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE MORTGAGE
ENTITLED TO PRIORITY AS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
OVER
A GENERAL JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF THE MORTGAG58
OR?'

The district court was correct in its application of the law and,
therefore, the certified question should be answered in the negative.
However, there is no conflict of authority in Florida, so there is no reason
for the supreme court to consider this case.
Commercial Laundries, Inc. v. Tiffany Square Investors Ltd. Partner"'
ship. 59
After the mortgagee bought a large residential complex at a
foreclosure, the operator of the coin operated laundry machines on the
premises tendered a rent check. Seven years were left on its ten year
unrecorded lease of the laundry facilities. To eliminate the lease, the
foreclosure buyer brought this reforeclosure action. The district court
correctly held that leasehold interests were subject to reforeclosure actions,
even if the tenant was innocent of any misconduct and even if the buyer had
notice of the lease's existence. Furthermore, the acceptance of rent by the
buyer did not necessarily preclude the buyer from reforeclosing.

157. d. at 602.
158. Id.
159. 605 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,614 So. 2d 504 (Fla.
1993).

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

Howell v. Gaines.160 Three mortgages had a provision for the
appointment of a receiver to collect the rents in the event of the mortgagor's
default. Following the foreclosure sales in which the mortgagees had been
the successful bidders, they sought the rents held by the receiver based upon
the deficiency between the mortgagees' bids and the amounts of the
foreclosure judgments. However, the mortgagor also claimed the rents,
because the fair market value of the properties exceeded the amounts of the
foreclosure judgments. The Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the
mortgagor. The mortgagee was entitled to the rents only to the extent that
it would be entitled to a deficiency judgment and the court may deny a
deficiency judgment when the fair market value of the property exceeds the
debts owed.' 6
Truitt v. Metropolitan Mortgage Co.'62 A borrower sued her mortgage broker, alleging that the broker had required her to pay for insurance
and appraisals by companies in which the broker had a substantial
ownership interest. The trial court dismissed the complaint based upon the
statute of limitations, but the district court reversed. The complaint was
based upon the mortgagee's alleged breach of the fiduciary duty by failing
to disclose any information adverse to the mortgagor's interest. That would,
if proved, have amounted to the fraudulent concealment of the information
that would have tolled the statute of limitations. Consequently, the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint.
Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin. 63 At a foreclosure sale, an
experienced representative of the mortgagee was given written instructions
to make a bid of $115,500. Unfortunately, the instructions were not written
clearly. She misread them and instead bid only $15,500. The winning bid
was $20,000. After the clerk announced that the property was sold, the
representative realized her mistake and tried, unsuccessfully, to have the sale
stopped. The mortgagee then moved to have the judicial sale set aside.

160. 608 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
161. The Third District Court of Appeal failed to mention section § 702.06, Florida
Statutes, which provides in pertinent part: "In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages
heretofore or hereafter executed the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a
deficiency, should one exist, shall be within the sound judicial discretion of the court ...
FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (1991).
162. 609 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
163. 605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The sale was confirmed and the Second District affirmed, holding that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the mortgagee relief
under these circumstances. Furthermore, the court refused to certify that
any conflict existed between the districts, because the decisions of the
Third 64 and Fourth'6 5 Districts were factually distinguishable. In those
cases, the mortgagees did not even make bids; the winning bids were for
nominal amounts; and, most important, the trial courts had exercised their
discretion to grant the mortgagees relief.'66 The court correctly recognized
that the critical point was the limited role of an appellate court in supervising the exercise of judicial discretion.
I. Recording
First American Title Insurance Co. v. Dixon.'67 This was a case of
first impression. The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided that a court
clerk, who failed to properly index a document that might affect title to
land, was not protected by sovereign immunity against a negligence claim.
The court reasoned that the clerk had a statutory duty to index every such
document, and the clerk was required by statute to post a bond to cover all
of his or her duties. Consequently, the Legislature must have intended the
purpose of the indexing duty was to protect the limited class of persons who
would rely upon the public records. Therefore, those harmed by the clerk's
negligence could seek redress.' 68
J. Restraints on Alienation
Camino Gardens Ass 'n v. McKim. 169 The declaration of restrictions in
a development provided that: (1) property in the subdivision could not be
purchased or leased by anyone who was not a member in good standing of
the homeowners' association; (2) that the association could, in the event of
mortgage foreclosure, redeem the property from the mortgagee or purchase
at the foreclosure sale for the amount due on the mortgage; and (3) that a

164. Van Delinder v. Albion Realty & Mortgage, Inc., 287 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973).
165. Fernandez v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 489 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).

166. Martin, 605 So. 2d at 534.
167. 603 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied sub noma. Dixon v.
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1993).

168. Id. at 566.
169. 612 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 620 So. 2d 760 (Fla.
.1993).
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mortgagee would have to give notice to the association before accepting a
deed in lieu of foreclosure. Therefore, when the mortgagee took a deed in
lieu of foreclosure, and then sold the property to buyers who had yet been
admitted to membership, the association sued. Both the trial court and the
district court had little difficulty recognizing that the first two provisions
were invalid restraints on alienation.
Restraints on alienation are invalid if they are absolute or unreasonable.
The first clause prohibited subsequent transfers without the prior approval
of the association. That amounted to an absolute restraint on alienation.
The second was essentially an option to purchase at the amount of the
defaulted debt, which could be far below the fair market value. Because
that would affect the willingness of lenders to make mortgage loans, it
would affect the ability to develop and to sell the property. Consequently,
it was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The trial court had also held the third provision invalid. The district
court affirmed, although the reason for the affirmance is less clear. The
court stated that "because the trial court declared the provision regarding
purchase rights to be void, the court properly concluded that the declaration
could not require the mortgagee to give any notice to the Association and
its members before accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure."' 0 This seems
only to indicate that the notice provision is inextricably connected to the
other two provisions in this case. That is not a blanket statement that such
a provision would necessarily be void. It is too bad that the court did not
elaborate.
K. Zoning
Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth.'' This
case involved a challenge to a zoning order's consistency with the comprehensive plan. The district court held that such a challenge must be made to
72
the entity that entered the order before it could be brought to a court.
This implicitly recognized that the agency has primary jurisdiction in such
matters. Moreover, the challenger must exhaust its administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The exception would be if the challenger was
merely seeking a temporary restraining order to avoid immediate and
irreparable harm.

170. Id.at 642.
171. 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1991).
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Caliente Partnership v. Johnston.7 3 A developer proposed an
amendment: to the county's comprehensive plan in order to accommodate its
proposed development. The amendment was submitted to the Department
of Community Affairs. It had forty-five days to determine whether to issue
a notice of intent to contest the amendment,' 74 but the notice arrived two
days late.' 5 The district court decided that the Department's having
missed the deadline would not result in the amendment being approved by
default. The developer must resort to other remedies. This conclusion
eliminates the possibility of the plan being amended by administrative inaction, which could undermine the concept of comprehensive planning.
Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, //.17 6 A developer had requested
rezoning of land it owned from agricultural to commercial use. The court
concluded that the site-specific, owner-initiated rezoning requests were
quasi-judicial proceedings that could be reviewed by the court. Moreover,
the fact that the rezoning request was consistent with the comprehensive
plan did not necessarily mean that the rezoning request must be granted.

IV. STATUTES
A. Leases
The Legislature appears to have provided tenants with a new remedy
if the premises have become uninhabitable. The tenant may withhold the
rent.'7 7 However, there are an overwhelming number of conditions to be
met before the tenant is entitled to this remedy. The leased premises must
have become "wholly untenantable."' 78 The lease must "affirmatively and
expressly" place the obligation for maintenance and repairs on the landlord. "79
' The landlord must have failed to make the needed repairs after
being given at least twenty days written notice of the problem. 8 ° And the
notice must include the threat to withhold rent.' 8 ' Moreover, if the repairs

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

604 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(8)(b) (1991).
Johnston, 604 So. 2d at 887.
619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Ch. 93-70 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 424 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.201).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ever do get made, the tenant must pay the landlord the entire rent withheld.' 82 This author predicts that this remedy will be, for all practical
purposes, illusory.
The Legislature also created a procedure for paying the claimed rent
into the registry of the court in any action for eviction.' 8 3 Also, the
landlord's acceptance of the full amount of rent that is past due will
constitute waiver of any claim for eviction based on nonpayment of rent if
the landlord knew of the breach when accepting the payment.'8 4
Part II of chapter 83 is the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act. ' 5 Section 83.49(3) governs the rights and responsibilities regarding
the return of security deposits. It has been amended to provide that
enforcement personnel "shall look solely to this subsection to determine
compliance."' 8 6 This should cut off complaints to the Florida Real Estate
Commission that brokers or salespeople have violated other statutes or rules
by complying with this one.
Section 83.49(3) was also amended to require that landlords give at
least twelve hours notice of the intent to enter and to make repairs and that
such repairs are to be made between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. 8 7 Moreover, tenants with waterbeds will now be required to carry insurance against
personal injury and property damage to the dwelling unit with a loss payable
clause to the building owner.'
Perhaps most interesting, the act allows
a landlord, who has given notice of his intent to terminate a tenant's lease,
to petition the county or circuit court for an injunction prohibiting the tenant
from intentional damage or destruction of the property.' 89
Part III of chapter 83 is the Self-storage Facility Act, 9 ° which
concerns the lease of space for the storage of personal property. The
Legislature expanded this act to include the lease of a "self-contained
storage unit," which is defined as:

182. Ch. 93-70 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 424 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.201).
183. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 425 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.232).
184. Id.§ 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 424-25 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.202).
185. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40-83.67 (1991).
186. Ch. 93-255 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2494 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.49(3) (1991)).
187. Id.§ 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2494 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.53(2) (1991)).
188. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2495 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.535 (1991)).
189. Id § 8, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2496 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.681). This
required amending section 34.011, Florida Statutes, to give the county court this limited
equity jurisdiction. Id.§ 9, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2497 (amending FLA. STAT. § 34.011 (1991)).
190. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.801-83.809 (1991).
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not less than 600 cubic feet in size, including, but not limited to,
a trailer, box, or other shipping container, which is leased by a
tenant primarily for use as storage space whether the unit is
located at a facility owned or operated by the owner or at another
location designated by the tenant.'
The rights and remedies of a lessor and tenant of a self-contained storage
unit are removed from the coverage of Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 2 which otherwise governs leases of personal property.
B. Mortgages
The statutory procedure for mortgage foreclosure has been modified as
of October 1, 1993.193 The mortgagor's right of redemption has been
clarified by the addition of a new section. It provides that the mortgagor
may redeem the property until the filing of the certificate of sale by the
court clerk or the time specified in the foreclosure decree, whichever is
"'
later. 94
This should eliminate any suggestion that Florida has any form
of "statutory redemption." That term is commonly used to indicate a right
to redeem during a statutory period that does not begin until the foreclosure
sale is complete.'9 5
It is, however, unfortunate that the phrase "cure the indebtedness" was
used.' 96 That may cause confusion over whether the Legislature intended
to allow a mortgagor in default to de-accelerate the mortgage debt by curing
the default, i.e., catching up on the missed payments. It is highly unlikely
that the Legislature intended de-acceleration. This would be a significant
change in redemption rights. If intended, this should be accomplished in
unambiguous terms.
Statutes have been amended to add new technical details such as
requiring that the creditor's current address be in a judgment or a recorded

191.
1992)).
192.
193.
194.
45.0315).
195.

Ch. 93-238 § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2409 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.803 (Supp.
FLA. STAT. ch. 680 (1991) ("Uniform Commercial Code-Leases").
Ch. 93-250, 1993 Fla. Laws 2466.
Ch. 93-250 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2467-68 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
See GEORGE E.

OSBORNE, MORTGAGES

§ 307 (2d ed. 1970); see also GRANT S.
§ 8.4 (2d ed. 1985).

NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW

196. Ch. 93-250 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2468 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 45.0315).
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affidavit in order to obtain a judgment lien,' 97 and providing details of the
method of obtaining in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over a person
outside the state of Florida.'9" It also appears that a number of amendments are intended to speed up foreclosures. For example, foreclosure sales
are now to be held no later than thirty-five days after the judgment of
foreclosure;' 99 the defendant is to file its written defenses within thirty
days of the first publication of the notice of the foreclosure; °. and notices
of the foreclosure need be published for only two consecutive weeks, rather
than four.2 ' Most important, a mortgagee may now request an order to
show cause why a final judgment of foreclosure should not be entered once
the verified complaint has been filed.20 2
Two acts deal with modification of the assignment of rents statute.20 3
Only a few different phrases distinguish the two acts. They provide that an
assignment of rents is valid and that it is perfected against third parties when
recorded. The assignee has the right to the rents if the mortgagor defaults
and the mortgagee makes a written demand for the rents. In a foreclosure
action, the court may require the rents deposited into the court registry and
used to pay the mortgage or to operate and to preserve the property. This
should clarify and simplify the law regarding assignment of rents in Florida.
C. Time Shares
A number of amendments were made to chapter 721, the Florida
Vacation Plan and Time-Sharing Act. 2 1 "Incidental benefits" have been
defined20" and subjected to statutory regulation.20 6 Most important, the

197. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2471 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 55.10(1)-55.10(3)
(1991)).
198. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2468 (amending FLA. STAT. § 48.194 (1991)).
199. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2467 (amending FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (1991)).
200. Id. § 7, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2470 (amending FLA. STAT. § 49.09 (1991)).
201. Ch. 93-250 § 8, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2470-71 (amending FLA. STAT. § 49.10 (1991)).
202. Id. § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2473 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 702.10).
203. Ch. 93-88, 1993 Fla. Laws at 468-69 (amending FLA, STAT. § 697.07 (1991)); Ch.
93-250 § 13, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2472-73 (amending FLA. STAT. § 697.07 (1991)).
204. FLA. STAT. § 721.01 (1991).
205. The Florida Statutes provide the following definition:
"Incidental benefit" means an accommodation, product, service, discount, or
other benefit which is offered to a prospective purchaser of a time-share plan or
to a purchaser of a time-share plan prior to the exchange of his initial 10-day
voidability period pursuant to s. 721.10; which is not an exchange program as
defined in subsection (15); and which complies with the provisions of s.
721.075. The term shall not include an offer of the use of accommodations and
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act has been expanded by the addition of a Part II, called the "Florida
Vacation Club Act,"2 7 to this chapter to deal with the unique problems of
multi-site plans. It attempts to protect time-share buyers from: (a) the
developer's creditors; (b) misrepresentations of the developer; and (c)
mismanagement (or malfeasance) of the developer. Multi-site time shares
will be governed by both Parts I and II, with the latter controlling in the
event of a conflict."' It appears to be a worthwhile expansion but only
time will tell if this approach is workable.
D. Uniform Land Sales PracticesLaw
The Florida Uniform Land Sales Practices Law2

9

was designed:

to provide safeguards regulating the disposition of any interest in
subdivided lands, including financial operations entered into by
companies and persons regulated by the Florida Uniform Land Sales
Practices Law, to prevent fraudulent and misleading methods and
unsound financing techniques which could detrimentally affect not only
remote land purchasers, but also the land sales industry, the public, and
the state's economic wellbeiig.2"0
The law covers "subdivisions" and "subdivided lands," which it defines
as having fifty or more "lots, parcels or units which are offered as part of
' but it also provides that certain acts are
a common promotional plan,"211
unlawful even in the offering for sale of twenty-five or more lots, units or
interests. The Legislature has added two more types of prohibited conduct
to the list: making or using false, fictitious or fraudulent statements,
representations or documents; or falsifying, concealing or covering up by
trick, scheme or device any material fact.212 The Legislature also added
requirements for obtaining exemptions2" 3 and requirements for purchase
contracts.21"4 The purchaser will now be given a seven day period in

facilities of the time-share plan on a free or discounted one-time basis.
Ch. 93-58 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 349 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.05 (1991)).
206. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 353 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.075).
207. Id. § 12, 1993 Fla. Laws at 360 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.50).
208. Id.

209. FLA. STAT. ch. 498 (1991).
210. Id. § 498.113(3).

211. Id. § 498.005(19).
212. Ch. 93-190 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 1710 (amending FLA. STAT. § 498.022 (1991)).
213. Id. § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1710-11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 498.025 (1991)).
214. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1716 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 498.028).
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which to chancel a purchase contract and, in the event of cancellation, all
funds must be refunded to the purchaser within twenty days.215 This is a
right which buyers may actually decide to exercise after reading the contract
carefully because the agreement, if title is not to be conveyed to the buyer
within 180 days, must contain the following ominous warning:
YOU MAY NOT RECEIVE YOUR LAND UNDER THIS CONTRACT IF THE SUBDIVIDER FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION OR OTHERWISE IS UNABLE TO PERFORM UNDER

THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT PRIOR TO YOUR RECEIVING
A DEED EVEN IF YOU HAVE MADE ALL THE PAYMENTS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CONTRACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THIS DOCUMENT,
CONSULT AN ATTORNEY.216

Let us hope that prospective buyers take this warning seriously.

V.

CONCLUSION

This has been an interesting, if not earth-shattering, year in property
law. The courts and the Legislature have been active. It appears that good
common sense and consumer protection are the prevailing themes.

215. Id.
216. Id.

